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Abstract 
We propose and test a theory explaining how and why decision makers engage in 
attractiveness discrimination in selection decisions. We integrate status generalization with 
interdependence theories and contextualize attractiveness discrimination within 
interdependent relationships among decision makers and candidates. Drawing on status 
generalization theory, we propose that decision makers associate attractiveness with 
competence in male but not in female candidates. We then draw on interdependence theory to 
propose that cooperative and competitive interdependence result in opposing patterns of 
attractiveness discrimination. When decision makers expect to cooperate with the candidate, 
they perceive attractive male candidates as more capable cooperators and discriminate in their 
favor. When decision makers expect to compete with the candidate, they perceive attractive 
male candidates as more capable competitors, and discriminate against them. Four studies, 
using different samples, selection tasks, manipulations of candidate attractiveness, and 
manipulations of interdependence, found evidence consistent with the theory. 
Keywords: selection decisions; attractiveness discrimination; status generalization 
theory; interdependence theory 
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That attractive people receive better treatment and outcomes in many domains of 
social life, including work, is almost a truism. Attractiveness discrimination, or differential 
treatment of individuals based on their physical appearance (Whitley & Kite, 2009), is 
pervasive in the modern workplace (Dipboye, Fromkin, & Wiback, 1975; Judge, Hurst, & 
Simon, 2009; Morrow, 1990). Attractiveness discrimination is particularly prevalent in 
selection decisions, defined as decisions “aimed at choosing people for the fulfillment of 
jobs” (Roe, 1998, p. 5). This is because, in selection situations, decision makers often 
encounter candidates for the first time and attractiveness has the greatest effect on person 
perception during initial impression formation (Feingold, 1992; Morrow, 1990). 
Attractiveness discrimination is troublesome because selection decisions based on criteria 
unrelated to work performance can lead to suboptimal staffing outcomes and threaten 
organizational success (Holtom, Mitchell, & Lee, 2006; Jawahar & Mattsson, 2005). 
Moreover, because selection decisions are among the most important determinants of career 
success (Gatewood, Feild, & Barrick, 2008), they are particularly relevant for the goal of 
social justice (Fassinger, 2008).  
Several decades of research suggest that attractive candidates are generally preferred 
to equally qualified unattractive candidates (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Hosoda, 
Romero, & Coats, 2003). Hosoda and colleagues (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 
attractiveness discrimination research and concluded that regardless of candidate sex, the type 
of task for which candidates are considered, the amount of job-relevant information about the 
candidates, or work experience of the decision makers, candidate’s “physical attractiveness is 
always an asset” (p. 451).  
Recent research challenges this view by showing that when candidates were of the 
same sex as the decision maker, attractive candidates were discriminated against (Agthe, 
Spörrle, & Maner, 2010; Luxen & Van De Vijver, 2006). These findings were interpreted 
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through an evolutionary intrasexual competition perspective, according to which attractive 
same-sex candidates are seen as a greater threat to decision makers’ mating opportunities. 
These studies highlight an important but overlooked condition impacting selection decisions: 
Decision makers’ personal outcomes are often not entirely independent from the candidate’s.  
In this research, we test the idea that the type of task-related interdependence (Katz & 
Kahn, 1978; Thompson, 1967) between the decision maker and the candidate can explain 
when and why decision makers discriminate in favor of or against attractive candidates. 
Figure 1 depicts the theory. We draw on status generalization theory and existing evidence to 
hypothesize that attractiveness is associated with perceived task-related competence of male 
but not female candidates. We then apply interdependence theory to propose that the two 
fundamental types of interdependence in organizations—cooperation and competition 
(Deutsch, 1949)—result in an opposing pattern of attractiveness discrimination. When 
decision makers expect to cooperate with a male candidate, they perceive attractive male 
candidates as more instrumental to their personal outcomes (more capable cooperators), and 
discriminate in their favor. When decision makers expect to compete with a male candidate, 
they perceive attractive male candidates as less instrumental to personal outcomes (more 
capable competitors), and discriminate against them. We test this theory across four studies, 
using different samples, selection tasks, manipulations of candidate attractiveness, and 
manipulations of interdependence. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Our results qualify the dominant conclusion that decision makers exhibit unvarying 
preference for attractive candidates (Hosoda et al., 2003; Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006). We 
show that taking into account the often overlooked role of the organizational context (cf. 
Johns, 2006) reveals the conditions under which candidate attractiveness can be an asset as 
well as a liability. Similarly, past explanations of attractiveness discrimination assumed that 
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decision makers’ outcomes were independent from candidates’ outcomes (e.g., Cann, 
Siegfried, & Pearce, 1981; Cash, Gillen, & Burns, 1977; Dipboye, Arvey, & Terpstra, 1977; 
Dipboye et al., 1975; Heilman & Saruwatari, 1979; Jawahar & Mattsson, 2005; Watkins & 
Johnston, 2000). We highlight that this assumption is often unrealistic because organizational 
members frequently select people they have to work with in the future (Edenborough, 2005; 
Harris, Brewster, & Sparrow, 2003; Hinds, Carley, Krackhardt, & Wholey, 2000).  
We also complement societal-level theories focusing on interdependence between 
groups to explain stereotyping and discrimination, including realistic group conflict theory 
(Campbell, 1965; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) and the stereotype content 
model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). These theories lead to the prediction that when a 
group is viewed favorably within society, its members are treated relatively more favorably. 
In contrast, we propose that even if attractive people enjoy a favorable perception at the 
societal level, they can be seen as less instrumental and be discriminated against when some 
degree of future competition in an organization is expected. 
This point also highlights a more general contribution of our work: the focus on 
decisions makers’ perception of the instrumentality of the candidate to themselves. Our theory 
casts discrimination in selection decisions as a subjectively rational behavior (Arrow, 1973; 
Phelps, 1972) . In contrast, the majority of extant research viewed discrimination as the 
prejudice-driven, affective reaction (Whitley & Kite, 2009). As we note previously, research 
showing decision makers discriminate against same-sex candidates as a result of intrasexual 
competition processes (e.g., Agthe et al., 2010; Luxen & Van De Vijver, 2006) is an 
exception. Yet, this perspective cannot account for a sizeable body of findings showing that 
decision makers discriminate in favor of attractive same-sex candidates (e.g., Bardack & 
McAndrew, 1985; Cann et al., 1981; Dipboye et al., 1977; Dipboye et al., 1975; Marlowe, 
Schneider, & Nelson, 1996; Quereshi & Kay, 1986; Watkins & Johnston, 2000). Our theory 
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explains why decision makers would in some cases discriminate against, and in some cases in 
favor of, attractive same-sex candidates.  
Theory 
Members of the same organization are often mutually interdependent. For example, 
they may share rewards (e.g., when the success of a research and development team is shared 
by all its members) or compete for valued outcomes (e.g., when only the salesperson who 
secures the most revenue gets a bonus). Selection decisions are thus often made with the 
expectation of a particular type of intra-organizational interdependence between the decision 
maker and the person who is selected for the job. There are many prominent real-world 
examples. In the financial services company J.P. Morgan, employees participate in making 
selection decisions about their future peers (J.P. Morgan, 2013). Google has a similar policy 
whereby employees evaluate their future peers and have a say in selection decisions (Google, 
2013). In academic departments, candidates for professorial positions are often selected by 
professors working in the same department (Darley, Zanna, & Roediger, 2003).  
As a result of interdependence, candidates’ future task performance may affect 
decision makers’ expected outcomes. Thus, decision makers should be interested in 
candidates’ competence and attempt to evaluate candidates’ competence from the cues 
available in a given situation. Decision makers are often faced with imperfect information 
about candidates’ competence (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972), which is why they might evaluate 
candidates’ competence based on, among other available information, candidates’ 
attractiveness. While there are different specific, context-dependent competence-related 
inferences people might make of attractive people (e.g., that they are more socially skilled), 
prior work on person perception suggests a global factor of perceived competence 
productively organizes most such specific judgments people make of others (Fiske et al., 
2002; Wojciszke, 1994).  
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We expect these attractiveness-based competence inferences to influence decision 
makers’ selection decisions. We argue that decision makers will prefer candidates stereotyped 
as more capable or stereotyped as less capable, depending on whether decision makers see the 
more capable candidate as more instrumental to personal outcomes. 
Attractiveness—Competence Association for Male versus Female Candidates 
The first part of our theory is based on theory and evidence suggesting that decision 
makers associate attractiveness with competence in men but not women (Berger & Zelditch, 
1985). Status generalization theory (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977) argues that 
externally accessible, status-relevant cues guide competence-related person perception and 
subsequent interpersonal interactions. External status characteristics affect expectations about 
a person’s competence, even when status characteristics are unrelated to actual competence. 
Such status characteristics are called “diffuse status characteristics” (Berger et al., 1977) due 
to their tendency to diffuse into perceptions of other, unrelated features of the person being 
evaluated (such as competence). A large program of research has found substantial evidence 
in support of this theory (Berger & Zelditch, 1985). 
Strong empirical support is available for the specific prediction from status 
generalization theory that sex (gender) is a diffuse status characteristic. Because men 
generally enjoy higher status than women, they are also seen as more competent than women 
(Meeker & Weitzel-O'Neill, 1977). Attractiveness also serves as diffuse status characteristic, 
with more attractive individuals enjoying higher status in society, which affects observers’ 
competence impressions (Webster & Driskell, 1983). The two status-relevant 
characteristics—candidate attractiveness and candidate sex—interact in guiding decision 
makers’ inferences about candidate competence (Jackson, Hunter, & Hodge, 1995). Jackson 
and colleagues (1995) argued that an individual’s attractiveness and sex jointly define 
perceived competence, such that the effect of attractiveness is stronger for men than for 
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women, as men’s higher status in society amplifies the benefits they derive from 
attractiveness. The results of their meta-analysis support this notion. 
The differential association between candidates’ attractiveness and perceived 
competence in men versus women is also consistent with findings from stereotype research, 
which shows that attractiveness amplifies the content of gender stereotypes (Dipboye et al., 
1975). Because males are stereotyped as more intelligent, competent, and achievement-
oriented than females (Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Langford & 
MacKinnon, 2000; Rudman & Glick, 2001; Walton & Cohen, 2003), this literature would 
also suggest that candidate sex and attractiveness should interact such that more attractive 
male (but not necessarily female) candidates are perceived as more competent.  
Considering the arguments and the existing evidence for the differential association 
between attractiveness and competence in men versus women, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. Decision makers perceive attractive male, but not female, candidates, as more 
competent. 
Interdependence and Perceived Instrumentality of Competent Candidates 
There are two main types of interdependence: cooperative and competitive (Deutsch, 
1949; D. W. Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Cooperative 
interdependence exists when individuals’ outcomes are positively correlated, such that the 
success of one person positively affects the success of the other person. In organizations, 
employees’ outcomes are often affected by the overall organizational performance, in that 
employees generally enjoy more benefits (e.g., job security, better working conditions, higher 
pay) in times of financial prosperity, but are also forced to share negative consequences in 
times of difficulty (e.g., pay cuts, layoffs). Organizations also create cooperative 
interdependence remunerating its members based on joint rather than individual performance.  
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Competitive interdependence exists when individuals’ outcomes are negatively 
correlated, such that the success of one person negatively affects the success of another 
person. Organizations create competitive interdependence by rewarding relative performance, 
so that the superior performance of an employee produces rewards for that individual but 
leaves other employees worse off. Such reward systems may be used to stimulate 
performance in a number of domains of organizational activity (Becker & Huselid, 1992; 
Casas-Arce & Martínez-Jerez, 2009). For example, employees working in sales may receive 
bonuses such that only the highest performer or a few employees with the highest 
performance receive a bonus. 
We argue that the expectation of cooperative versus competitive interdependence will 
determine the pattern of attractiveness discrimination in selection decisions. In the 
evolutionary work we previously cited, attractive same-sex candidates were seen as a greater 
threat to decision makers’ mating opportunities and, consequentially, discriminated against 
(Agthe et al., 2010; Luxen & Van De Vijver, 2006). In a similar manner, we argue that work-
related competence can make candidates seem more or less instrumental to decision makers’ 
personal outcomes (and thus discriminated in favor of or against), depending on the type of 
expected work-related interdependence. 
When expecting cooperative interdependence with the candidate, the decision maker 
will be motivated to select the candidate seen as the most competent because such candidate 
would be the most instrumental to personal outcomes (Hinds et al., 2000; Ridgeway, 1984; 
Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). As detailed before, decision makers should infer competence from 
candidate attractiveness in men, but not in women, in that attractive men are seen as more 
competent. Thus, when cooperation is expected, decision makers should discriminate in favor 
of attractive male (but not female) candidates.  
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The opposite reasoning applies when the decision maker expects competitive 
interdependence with the candidate. In this case, the decision maker will be motivated not to 
select the person seen as the most competent, because such a person would represent the most 
capable competitor to the detriment of the decision maker’s interest (Friebel & Raith, 2004; 
Garcia, Song, & Tesser, 2010). Rather, a candidate seen as less competent would be seen as 
more instrumental to the decision maker’s personal outcomes. Thus, because attractive male 
(but not female) candidates are seen as more competent, decision makers should see them as 
less instrumental to personal outcomes and discriminate against attractive male (but not 
female) candidates. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. When decision makers expect to cooperate with the candidate, they prefer an 
attractive to an unattractive male, but not female, candidate. 
Hypothesis 3. When decision makers expect to compete with the candidate, they prefer an 
unattractive to an attractive male, but not female, candidate. 
We also test the psychological process driving decision makers’ responses to 
candidate attractiveness—the perception of the extent to which the candidate is instrumental 
to decision makers’ personal outcomes. The higher perceived competence of the attractive 
male candidate should lead to the higher perceived instrumentality of the attractive candidate 
to the decision maker when the two are expected to cooperate because the candidate’s 
competence at work would positively affects decision makers’ success. In contrast, the higher 
perceived competence of the attractive male candidate should lead to lower perceived 
instrumentality of the attractive candidate to the decision maker when the two are expected to 
compete because the candidate’s competence at work would negatively affect decision 
makers’ success. Candidates perceived as more instrumental to the decision maker should be 
discriminated in favor of because this satisfies the decision makers self-interest (Lewin, 1935; 
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Miller, 1999). Taken together, this formulation implies a moderated mediation model, which 
we depict in Figure 2 and summarize in our final hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4. Higher perceived competence of attractive male candidates leads to a higher 
(lower) relative perceived instrumentality of the attractive candidate to the decision maker 
when cooperation (competition) is expected, in turn resulting in a higher (lower) selection 
preference for the attractive candidate. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants and design. Two-hundred and forty-one adults (50.2% male; Mage = 
31.44, SDage = 12.21; 98.3% with prior work experience; 54.8% with a university degree or 
above), recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, took part in the study in exchange for 
$0.50. Information about participant race and current employment was not collected in 
Studies 1 and 2. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 3 
(interdependence: competition, cooperation, or no interdependence; between-participants) × 2 
(candidate sex: male vs. female; between-participants) × 2 (candidate attractiveness: attractive 
and unattractive; within-participants) design. In the first two studies, we focused on same-sex 
decision maker—candidate dyads in keeping with research on discrimination against 
attractive competitors for mates that inspired our work (e.g., Agthe et al., 2010; Luxen & Van 
De Vijver, 2006). We extended our study design in Studies 3 and 4 by also including mixed-
sex dyads.  
Procedure and materials. Interdependence manipulation. Participants first read a 
hiring scenario describing expected competitive interdependence, cooperative 
interdependence, or no interdependence between themselves as the decision maker and the 
candidate. The no interdependence condition was included for reasons of continuity with prior 
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work on the role of attractiveness in selection decisions (e.g., Cann et al., 1981; Cash et al., 
1977; Dipboye et al., 1977; Dipboye et al., 1975; Heilman & Saruwatari, 1979; Jawahar & 
Mattsson, 2005; S. K. Johnson, Podratz, Dipboye, & Gibbons, 2010). We developed the 
scenarios following previous vignettes on interdependence in organization (Chatman & 
Barsade, 1995; Toma, Yzerbyt, & Corneille, 2010). Appendix A contains the text of the 
scenario. To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, we asked participants to indicate 
their agreement with the following statements: “In the given hiring scenario, the new hire will 
be my competitor [cooperator]” on a scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly 
agree. 
Candidate attractiveness manipulation. Next, participants were told they would 
evaluate the two final candidates for the position described based on their resumes. 
Participants saw the resumes of two candidates (of the same sex as the participant), presented 
in random order. The word-length and the format of the resumes were held constant. We 
slightly varied the contents of the resumes (education, experience, and hobbies) across 
candidates to make the task more believable. Both candidates were said to be 21 years old. 
Candidate attractiveness was manipulated by varying the appearance of the person 
shown in the picture accompanying the resume. To this end, we adopted standardized 
headshots of attractive versus unattractive males and females developed and used in prior 
research (Braun, Gruendl, Marberger, & Scherber, 2001; Meier, D’Agostino, Elliot, Maier, & 
Wilkowski, 2012; van der Weiden, Veling, & Aarts, 2010; Van Leeuwen, Veling, Van 
Baaren, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). The pictures were computer-generated to represent either a 
prototypical attractive person or a prototypical unattractive person and were highly 
standardized (see Braun et al., 2001 for details). We counterbalanced the picture of an 
attractive versus unattractive person across the two resumes, excluding the possibility that the 
effect of the candidate attractiveness manipulation is due to differences other than candidate 
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images. A separate data collection, reported in the Appendix B, suggested manipulation 
effectiveness. 
Perceived competence and instrumentality. After reviewing the resumes, participants 
responded to four questions measuring perceived competence taken from past research 
(Rudman, 1998): “How competent do you think this candidate is?”; “How intelligent do you 
think this candidate is?”; “How well do you think this candidate will perform in this job?”; 
and “How successful do you think the candidate will be in his/her career?” (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much; αattractive = .89; α unattractive = .89). In addition, following previous research 
(Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008, 2009), we measured perceived instrumentality of the candidate to 
the decision maker by asking participants to respond to the following statement: “Assuming 
that this candidate is hired, the presence of this person in my team makes it likelier that I will 
succeed in my career” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Dependent variable: selection decisions. Finally, participants responded to a selection 
decision measure taken from past research (Heilman & Saruwatari, 1979): “How likely would 
you be to recommend hiring this candidate for the position?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).  
Results 
Manipulation check. Planned contrasts found that the perception that candidate 
would represent a cooperator was higher in the cooperation condition (M = 8.24, SD = 1.44) 
than in either the competition condition (M = 2.78, SD = 2.50), F(1, 238) = 312.36, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .57, or the no interdependence condition (M = 6.74, SD = 1.76), F(1, 238) = 23.38, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .09. In addition, the perception that candidate would represent a competitor was 
higher in the competition condition (M = 8.26, SD = 1.13) than in either the cooperation 
condition (M = 2.59, SD = 2.27), F(1, 238) = 351.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .60, or the no 
interdependence condition (M = 5.81, SD = 2.15), F(1, 238) = 65.93 p < .001, ηp2 = .22. Thus, 
the interdependence manipulation was effective. 
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Hypothesis 1 test: attractiveness—competence association for male versus female 
candidates. A mixed-effects analysis of variance (ANOVA) on perceived competence found 
that the interaction between candidate sex and candidate attractiveness was significant, F(1, 
239) = 16.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, such that the attractive male candidate was seen as more 
competent (M = 5.41, SD = 0.84) than the unattractive candidate (M = 5.14, SD = 0.87), F(1, 
239) = 18.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, but the attractive female candidate was not perceived as 
differing in competence (M = 5.42, SD = 0.88) compared to the unattractive female candidate 
(M = 5.51, SD = 0.72), F(1, 239) = 2.27, p = .133, ηp2 = .01. These results support Hypothesis 
1. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 test: interdependence and attractiveness discrimination. 
Mean selection decisions by condition are displayed in Figure 3. A mixed-effects ANOVA 
found a significant 3-way interaction among interdependence, candidate sex, and candidate 
attractiveness on selection decisions, F(2, 235) = 3.28, p = .039, ηp2 = .03, such that the effect 
of candidate attractiveness varied significantly as a function of interdependence among male 
candidates, F(2, 238) = 15.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, but not among female candidates, F(2, 238) 
= 1.52, p = .221, ηp2 = .01. To test our specific hypotheses, we analyzed simple effects of 
candidate attractiveness within the different interdependence conditions for male versus 
female candidates. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
In the cooperation condition, the attractive male candidate was preferred (M = 5.41, 
SD = 1.02) to the unattractive male candidate (M = 4.92, SD = 1.01), F(1, 235) = 8.72, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .04. There was no difference between preference for attractive (M = 4.90, SD = 
1.03) and unattractive female candidates (M = 4.63, SD = 1.10), F(1, 235) = 2.85, p = .093, 
ηp2 = .01. These results support Hypothesis 2. 
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In the competition condition, the unattractive male candidate was preferred (M = 4.74, 
SD = 0.94) to the attractive male candidate (M = 4.02, SD = 1.32), F(1, 235) = 20.19, p <. 
001, ηp2 = .08. There was no differences between preference for attractive (M = 4.68, SD = 
1.42) and unattractive female candidates (M = 4.80, SD = 1.18), F(1, 235) = 0.59, p = .444, 
ηp2 < .01. These results support Hypothesis 3.  
In the no interdependence condition, selection preference did not differ as a function 
of candidate attractiveness for either male (Mattractive = 5.43, SDattractive = 1.08; Munattractive = 
5.22, SDunattractive = 0.80), F(1, 235) = 1.51, p = .221, ηp2 = .01, or female candidates (Mattractive 
= 5.48, SDattractive = 0.96; Munattractive = 5.28, SDunattractive = 1.01), F(1, 235) = 1.51, p = .221, ηp2 
= .01. 
Hypothesis 4 test: the role of instrumentality perception. Figure 2 depicts the 
hypothesized psychological process. We followed Judd, Kenny, and McClelland’s (2001) 
guidelines for testing mediation in within-subject designs. For all variables, we computed 
relative scores of attractive versus unattractive candidates by subtracting the ratings for the 
unattractive candidate from the ratings for the attractive candidate. We tested the moderated 
mediation model using OLS regression to estimate individual paths and the bootstrap method 
with 10,000 resamples to test the significance of indirect effects (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
Consistent with our theory and findings that attractiveness affects perceived competence and 
selection preference only among male (but not female) candidates, the mediation analysis 
focused on male candidates. 
When the decision maker expected to cooperate with the candidate, the higher 
perceived competence of the attractive male candidate predicted a higher perceived 
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker, b = 0.93, SE = 0.23, p < .001. In turn, 
the higher perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker predicted a higher 
selection preference for the candidate, b = 0.66, SE = 0.05 p < .001, thus producing a 
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significant and positive indirect effect of the higher perceived competence of the attractive 
male candidate on selection preference, 95% CI [0.26, 0.72].  
In contrast, when the decision maker expected to compete with the candidate, the 
higher perceived competence of the attractive male candidate predicted a lower perceived 
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker, b = -1.36, SE = 0.27, p < .001. As 
mentioned above, the higher perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker 
in turn predicted a higher selection preference for the candidate, b = 0.66, SE = 0.05, p < .001, 
thus producing a significant and negative indirect effect of the higher perceived competence 
of the attractive male candidate on selection preference, 95% CI [-1.08, -0.38]. The results of 
the mediation analysis support Hypothesis 4. 
Discussion 
Study 1 found support for our theory. At the same time, we note that we found no 
effects of candidate attractiveness on selection decisions in the no interdependence condition. 
The non-significant finding in our study may perhaps be understood by examining the 
relevant means of participants’ responses to the manipulation checks asking whether the 
candidate was a cooperator or a competitor. The responses within the no interdependence 
condition indicate that some participants interpreted the situation as cooperative and some as 
competitive (Mcooperator = 6.74, SDcooperator = 1.76; Mcompetitor = 5.81, SDcompetitor = 2.15), which 
might have eliminated any effect of candidate attractiveness. Specifically, in line with our 
theory, among those who interpreted the situation as cooperative, male candidate 
attractiveness might have led to discrimination in favor of the attractive candidate, while 
among those who interpreted the situation as competitive, male candidate attractiveness might 
have led to discrimination against the attractive candidate.  
It is also possible that decision makers in the no interdependence condition simply did 
not care which candidate was selected for the position because they were making a decision 
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irrelevant to their personal outcomes (Rudman, 1998). Indeed, we find overall very high 
means of selection preference in the no interdependence condition (Mattractive = 5.45, SDattractive 
= 1.02; Munattractive = 5.25, SDunattractive = 0.91, on a scale ranging from one to seven), 
suggesting that participants did not scrutinize the candidates much. Although there was a 
slight trend in the direction of preference for the attractive candidates that is consistent with 
past research showing general preferences for attractive candidates (Hosoda et al., 2003), the 
effect was non-significant.  
Study 2 
Study 2 sought to constructively replicate our findings in the context of real selection 
decisions. To this end, we manipulated interdependence by varying the rewards systems for 
an actual task in the lab and asked participants to select another person to work on the task.  
Methods 
Participants and design. Ninety-two adults (54. 3% male; Mage = 32.06, SDage = 
10.44; 96.7% with prior job experience; 78.2% with a university degree or higher) recruited 
through a behavioral research lab took part in the study in exchange for £10. They were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 3 (interdependence: competition, cooperation, or no 
interdependence; between-participants) × 2 (candidate sex: male vs. female; between-
participants) × 2 (candidate attractiveness: attractive and unattractive; within-participants) 
design. 
Procedure and materials. Sign-up survey. Participants signed up for the experiment 
one week in advance. When signing up, they were asked to respond to an online survey. After 
logging in, participants read that the lab study would consist of choosing another person and 
taking part in a “question-and-answer game” (Q&A game), in which they would respond to 
trivia questions (e.g., Klein & Kunda, 1992; Vonk, 1998). The online survey asked 
participants to report their age, race, and education details. We also asked them to submit 
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headshot photos using the online survey and to solve ten sample questions for the Q&A game 
(e.g., “Which number comes next in the series? 1–1–2–3–5–8–13–?”). At the end of the 
survey, participants were told that the information they submitted online would be used to 
prepare the brief profile of each participant, which would be used on the day of the 
experiment.  
Interdependence manipulation. A week after filling in the online survey, participants 
arrived to the lab one-by-one. They were seated in an individual room and instructed by the 
experimenter that the Q&A game consisted of two parts: participant selection and one round 
of the Q&A game. They were told they would select another participant to engage in the 
game, and that there were currently two other participants (located in different rooms) 
available. Participants were then asked to spend several minutes familiarizing themselves with 
the Q&A game instruction sheet, which explained that the other participant would be either 
competitively or cooperatively interdependent with the participant. Appendix C contains the 
text of the manipulation. To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, we asked 
participants to indicate their agreement with the following statements: “The person I choose 
as the other player will be my cooperator [competitor]” on a scale ranging from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
Selection decisions. After reading the instruction sheet, participants reviewed the 
profiles of two candidates, ostensibly the two other participants waiting in other rooms. The 
profiles included candidates’ age (either 24 or 25 years old), race (White), education 
(university degree), and the number of points obtained in the sample questions of the pre-
survey. We manipulated candidate attractiveness by inserting the same stimulus headshot 
pictures as in Study 1 (counterbalanced across profiles) at the top of each profile.  
Perceived competence and instrumentality. We used the same measure of perceived 
competence of the candidate as in Study 1 (αattractive = .79; αunattractive = .87). Perceived 
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instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker was measured using a similar item as in 
Study 1: “Assuming that this person becomes the other player, this makes it more likely that I 
will succeed in the Q&A game.” on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). 
Dependent variable: selection decisions. Participants indicated their partner 
preference using an item taken from past research (Albert, Hill, & Venkatsubramanyan, 
2011): “Would you select this person as your task partner?” on a 7-point scale (1 = absolutely 
not select, 7 = definitely select).  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. Planned contrasts found that the perception that the other player 
would represent a cooperator was higher in the cooperation condition (M = 6.66, SD = 0.75) 
than in either the competition condition (M = 2.32, SD = 1.87), F(1, 89) = 107.32, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .55, or the no interdependence condition (M = 3.48, SD = 2.10), F(1, 89) = 55.60, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .39. In addition, the perception that the other player would represent a competitor 
was higher in the competition condition (M = 6.29, SD = 1.22) than in either the cooperation 
condition (M = 2.06, SD = 1.88), F(1, 89) = 107.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .55, or the no 
interdependence condition (M = 2.28, SD = 1.67), F(1, 89) = 92.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .51. Thus, 
the interdependence manipulation was effective. 
Hypothesis 1 test: attractiveness—competence association for male versus female 
candidates. A mixed-effects ANOVA on perceived competence found that the interaction 
between candidate sex and candidate attractiveness was significant, F(1, 90) = 20.04, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .18, such that the attractive male candidate was seen as more competent (M = 5.39, 
SD = 0.65)  than the unattractive male candidate (M = 4.57, SD = 0.74), F(1, 90) = 66.69, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .43, but the attractive female candidate was not perceived as differing in 
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competence (M = 5.44, SD = 0.54) compared to the unattractive female candidate (M = 5.29, 
SD = 0.66), F(1, 90) = 2.00, p = .161, ηp2 = .02. These results support Hypothesis 1. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 test: interdependence and attractiveness discrimination. 
Mean selection decisions by condition are displayed in Figure 4. A mixed-effects ANOVA 
found a significant 3-way interaction among interdependence, candidate sex, and candidate 
attractiveness on selection decisions, F(2, 86) = 5.83, p = .004, ηp2 = .12, such that the effect 
of candidate attractiveness varied significantly as a function of interdependence among male 
candidates, F(2, 89) = 18.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, but not among female candidates, F(2, 89) = 
0.20, p = .816, ηp2 = .01. We analyzed simple effects of candidate attractiveness to test our 
hypotheses.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
In the cooperation condition, the attractive male candidate was preferred (M = 6.12, 
SD = 0.99) to the unattractive male candidate (M = 4.29, SD = 1.45), F(1, 86) = 17.74, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .17. There was no difference between preference for attractive (M = 5.40, SD = 
0.83) and unattractive female candidates (M = 4.87, SD = 1.41), F(1, 86) = 1.34, p = .250, ηp2 
= .02. These results support Hypothesis 2. 
In the competition condition, the unattractive male candidate was preferred (M = 5.11, 
SD = 1.10) to the attractive male candidate (M = 3.37, SD = 1.34), F(1, 86) = 17.99, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .17. There was no difference between preference for attractive (M = 4.00, SD = 1.04) 
and unattractive female candidates (M = 3.92, SD = 0.79), F(1, 86) =0.03, p = .872, ηp2 < .001. 
These results support Hypothesis 3. 
In the no interdependence condition, selection preference did not differ as a function 
of candidate attractiveness for either male (Mattractive= 5.29, SDattractive = 1.27; Munattractive = 4.86, 
SDunattractive = 1.41), F(1, 86) = 0.81, p = .371, ηp2 = .01, or female candidates (Mattractive = 4.93, 
SDattractive = 0.88; Munattractive = 4.47, SDunattractive = 1.06), F(1, 86) = 1.03, p = .3142, ηp2 = .01.  
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Hypothesis 4 test: the role of instrumentality perception. We used the same 
procedure as in Study 1 to test the moderated mediation relationship implied by Hypothesis 4.  
When the decision maker expected to cooperate with the candidate, the higher 
perceived competence of the attractive male candidate predicted a higher perceived 
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker, b = 1.69, SE = 0.45, p = .001. In turn, 
the higher perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker predicted a higher 
selection preference for the candidate, b = 0.86, SE = 0.15, p < .001, thus producing a 
significant and positive indirect effect of the higher perceived competence of the attractive 
male candidate on selection preference, 95% CI [0.84, 2.62].  
In contrast, when the decision maker expected to compete with the candidate, the 
higher perceived competence of the attractive male candidate predicted lower perceived 
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker, b = -1.26, SE = 0.59, p = .037. As 
mentioned above, perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker in turn 
predicted a higher selection preference for the candidate, b = 0.86, SE = 0.15, p < .001. This 
pattern of effects produced a significant and negative indirect effect of the higher perceived 
competence of the attractive male candidate on selection preference, 95% CI [-2.61, -0.02]. 
The results of the mediation analysis support Hypothesis 4. 
Study 3 
Study 3 was designed to extend the previous studies in several ways. First, we used a 
fully crossed design in terms of participant and candidate sex. This allowed us to verify that 1) 
the sex effects we document are indeed due to inferences related to candidate sex, rather than 
decision makers’ sex-specific decision-making tendencies, and 2) that the effects we 
document generalize to both decision makers’ sexes.  
Second, in addition to measuring selection decisions using continuous ratings, we also 
administered a binary selection measure. Although decision makers often rank candidates 
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using continuous scales when evaluating them, we wanted to ensure that our results also hold 
for more categorical, “hire versus do not hire” decisions. 
Finally, we included a measure of perceived warmth of the candidate to empirically 
distinguish our predictions from predictions made by societal-level discrimination theories 
such as stereotype content model. This model predicts that cooperation (vs. competition) with 
a group translates into a generalized sense of warmth (vs. coldness) toward that group, 
ultimately causing more favorable (unfavorable) treatment of its members (Fiske et al., 2002). 
In contrast, our theory suggests that a more immediate, self-interested consideration of the 
work-related relevance of the candidate to the decision maker flowing from expected 
interdependence should explain decision makers’ discrimination decisions even after 
controlling for the generalized perception of candidates’ warmth. 
Method 
Participants and design. For this study and Study 4, we used the G*power 3.1 
software to calculate the number of participants that would be needed, based on our study 
design, to significantly detect a small effect (f = 0.1) based on Cohen’s (2005) classification. 
This calculation suggested the required number of participants is 264. We recruited 271 adults 
(48.7% male; Mage = 32.40, SDage = 9.60) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, who took part in 
the study in exchange for $1.00.  
 To bring our sample characteristics more in line with those of organizational decision 
makers, for main Studies 3 and 4, we requested only workers who were currently employed in 
organizations, and we indicated preference for those who had experience participating in 
hiring activities. The average tenure of participants with their current organization was 5.69 
years (SD = 6.78), the average year of work experience was 14.82 years (SD = 11.14), and 
77.2% had participated in hiring activities in their workplace. Among participants, 74.9% 
were White, 12.2% Asian, and 8.5% Black. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (participant sex: male vs. 
female; between-participants) × 2 (interdependence: competition vs. cooperation; between-
participants) × 2 (candidate sex: male vs. female; between-participants) × 2 (candidate 
attractiveness: attractive and unattractive; within-participants) design. We did not include a 
no-interdependence condition (either in this study or Study 4) as in our previous studies we 
did not find any discriminatory behavior in this condition, and because the two 
interdependence conditions are the only ones that test our theory. 
Procedure and materials. The procedure was identical to that of Study 1 except for 
the inclusion of a measure of perceived warmth of the candidate and an additional binary 
measure of selection decisions, which we describe below. For all composite study measures, α 
was greater than .93. 
Perceived warmth. Participants responded to six questions measuring perceived 
warmth of the candidate taken from past research (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Cuddy, 
Glick, & Beninger, 2011; Fiske et al., 2002): “How likable [warm] [friendly] [sincere] [kind] 
[trustworthy] do you think this candidate is?” on a scale ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
very much). 
Dependent variable: selection decisions. In addition to the continuous measure of 
selection decisions used in Study 1, participants were also asked to recommend one 
candidate to be hired for their team, and the responses were coded as 0 = unattractive 
candidate and 1 = attractive candidate.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. Planned contrasts found that the perception that the candidate 
would represent a cooperator was higher in the cooperation condition (M = 6.69, SD = 0.77) 
than in the competition condition (M = 2.35, SD = 1.80), F(1, 269) = 680.84, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.72. In addition, the perception that the candidate would represent a competitor was higher in 
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the competition condition (M = 6.20, SD = 1.70) than in the cooperation condition (M = 1.73, 
SD = 1.45), F(1, 269) = 546.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .67. Thus, the interdependence manipulation 
was effective. 
Hypothesis 1 test: attractiveness—competence association for male versus female 
candidates. Preliminary analyses for all hypotheses tests found that participant sex had no 
significant effects nor interactions (ps > .084), so we report the results of analyses conducted 
without this factor.  
A mixed-effects ANOVA on perceived competence found that the interaction between 
candidate sex and candidate attractiveness was significant, F(1, 269) = 40.24, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.13, such that the attractive male candidate was seen as more competent (M = 5.97, SD = 0.81) 
than the unattractive male candidate (M = 5.22, SD = 0.75), F(1, 269) = 70.83, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.21, but the attractive female candidate was not perceived as differing in competence (M = 
5.53, SD = 1.05) compared to the unattractive female candidate (M = 5.58, SD = 1.03), F(1, 
269) = 0.29, p = .589, ηp2 < .01. These results support Hypothesis 1. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 test: interdependence and attractiveness discrimination.  
Continuous measure of selection decisions. Mean selection decisions by condition 
are displayed in Figure 5A. A mixed-effects ANOVA found a significant 3-way interaction 
among interdependence, candidate sex, and candidate attractiveness on continuous selection 
decisions, F(1, 267) = 28.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, such that the effect of candidate 
attractiveness varied significantly as a function of interdependence among male candidates, 
F(1, 268) = 53.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, but not among female candidates, F(1, 268) = 0.02, p = 
.875, ηp2 < .01. We analyzed simple effects of candidate attractiveness to test our hypotheses.  
[Insert Figure 5A about here] 
In the cooperation condition, the attractive male candidate was preferred (M = 6.11, 
SD = 1.13) to the unattractive male candidate (M = 4.82, SD = 1.20), F(1, 267) = 21.40, p < 
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.001, ηp2 = .07. There was no difference between preference for attractive (M = 5.37, SD = 
1.52) and unattractive female candidates (M = 5.55, SD = 1.35), F(1, 267) = 0.38, p = .540, 
ηp2 < .01. These results support Hypothesis 2. 
In the competition condition, the unattractive male candidate was preferred (M = 5.34, 
SD = 1.34) to the attractive male candidate (M = 3.61, SD = 1.91), F(1, 267) = 32.32, p <. 
001, ηp2 = .11. There was no difference between preference for attractive (M = 4.48, SD = 
1.85) and unattractive female candidates (M = 4.59, SD = 1.76), F(1, 267) = 0.16, p = .687, 
ηp2 < .01. These results support Hypothesis 3. 
Binary measure of selection decisions. Participants’ selection decision frequencies by 
condition are displayed in Figure 5B. For this and all other analyses involving binary 
outcomes, we used logistic regression. We analyzed participants’ binary selection decisions as 
a function of candidate sex and interdependence condition. We found a significant interaction 
between candidate sex and interdependence, b = -2.06, SE = 0.73, p = .005. For male 
candidates, the coefficient for the effect of interdependence (0 = cooperation, 1 = 
competition) on selection decisions (0 = unattractive candidate, 1 = attractive candidate) was 
significant and negative, b = -1.90, SE = 0.54, p = .001. This suggests a greater likelihood of 
preference for the attractive male candidate when the decision maker expected cooperation 
(58 out of 74; 78.4%) than when competition was expected (16 out of 61; 26.2%).  
[Insert Figure 5B about here] 
For female candidates, the coefficient for the effect of interdependence on selection 
decisions was non-significant, b = 0.16, SE = 0.49, p = .744, showing that preference between 
the attractive and the unattractive female candidates was not affected by decision maker—
candidate interdependence. Specifically, attractive candidates were selected over unattractive 
candidates at about the same rate in both the cooperation condition (28 out of 67; 41.8) and 
INTERDEPENDENCE AND ATTRACTIVENESS DISCRIMINATION 25 
the competition condition (31 out of 69; 44.9%:). The binary selection decisions results also 
support Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
Hypothesis 4 test: the role of instrumentality perception.  
Continuous measure of selection decisions. To test the moderated mediation 
relationship implied by Hypothesis 4, we first analyzed the continuous measure of selection 
decisions. We used the same procedure as in prior studies and we also controlled for the 
perceived warmth of the candidate. 
When the decision maker expected to cooperate with the candidate, the higher 
perceived competence of the attractive male candidate predicted a higher perceived 
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker, b = 1.16, SE = 0.21, p < .001. In turn, 
the higher perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker predicted a higher 
selection preference for the candidate, b = 0.93, SE = 0.06, p < .001, thus producing a 
significant and positive indirect effect of the higher perceived competence of the attractive 
male candidate on selection preference, 95% CI [0.43, 1.26].  
In contrast, when the decision maker expected to compete with the candidate, the 
higher perceived competence of the attractive male candidate predicted a lower perceived 
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker, b = -1.69, SE = 0.24, p < .001. As 
mentioned above, the higher perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker 
in turn predicted a higher selection preference for the candidate, b = 0.93, SE = 0.06, p < .001, 
thus producing a significant and negative indirect effect of the higher perceived competence 
of the attractive male candidate on selection preference, 95% CI [-1.84, -0.68].  
Binary measure of selection decisions. We repeated the same procedure using the 
binary measure of selection decisions as the dependent variable. The results of the first stage 
of the indirect effect are identical to those for the continuous decisions. In the second stage, 
the higher perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker predicted higher 
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likelihood of being selected, b = 0.15, SE = 0.13, p < .001. Thus, when the decision maker 
expected to cooperate with the candidate, the higher perceived instrumentality of the attractive 
male candidate mediated the positive effect of the higher perceived competence of the 
attractive candidate on binary selection decisions, 95% CI [0.47, 2.12]. 
In contrast, when the decision maker expected to compete with the candidate, the 
lower perceived instrumentality of the attractive male candidate to the decision maker 
mediated the negative effect of the higher perceived competence of the attractive candidate on 
binary selection decisions, 95% CI [-3.10, -0.64]. The results of the analyses of both 
continuous and binary measures of selection decisions support Hypothesis 4. 
Study 4 
The primary goal of Study 4 was to replicate our findings using a different 
manipulation of candidate attractiveness and, in that way, to increase the generalizability of 
our conclusions. To this end, we used photos of business school students, naturally varying in 
attractiveness, who were about to apply for jobs. We selected sets of photos matched in terms 
of attractiveness difference to create a fully standardized attractiveness manipulation while 
taking the advantage of the ecological realism the photos provided. 
Methods 
Participants and design. Two-hundred and seventy-three working adults (50.9% 
male; Mage = 32.78, SDage = 10.04), recruited following the same procedure as in Study 3, took 
part in the study in exchange for $1.00. All participants were currently employed, the average 
tenure of participants with the current organization was 5.90 years (SD = 6.39), the average 
year of work experience was 16.23 years (SD = 11.37), and 50.2% had participated in hiring 
activities in their workplace. Among participants, 76.6% were White, 11.0% Asian, and 8.4% 
Black. They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (participant sex: male vs. 
female; between-participants) × 2 (interdependence: competition vs. cooperation; between-
INTERDEPENDENCE AND ATTRACTIVENESS DISCRIMINATION 27 
participants) × 2 (candidate sex: male vs. female; between-participants) × 2 (candidate 
attractiveness: attractive and unattractive; within-participants) design.  
Procedure and materials. The procedure was identical to that of Study 3 except the 
new candidate attractiveness manipulation. For all study measures, α was greater than .93. 
Candidate attractiveness manipulation. We obtained photos from a yearbook of a 
graduating class at a European business school (the total class size was 122). All photos were 
in color, showing students in their mid-20s (most White), and focused on their head and 
shoulders. Following past research (S. K. Johnson et al., 2010), we excluded photos that 
showed any facial disfigurements, inappropriate hair or clothing, or in which the person wore 
glasses. We focused on a subsample of 17 male and 18 female students (all White) based on 
this selection. Appendix D reports the results of a separate data collection in which students’ 
attractiveness was rated. Based on the ratings, we selected a final set of 12 photographs such 
that the mean difference between attractive and unattractive men was significant and almost 
identical to the mean difference between attractive and unattractive women, which was also 
significant. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. Planned contrasts found that the perception that the candidate 
would represent a cooperator was higher in the cooperation condition (M = 6.55, SD = 1.13) 
than in the competition condition (M = 2.25, SD = 1.90), F(1, 271) = 518.16, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.66. In addition, the perception that the candidate would represent a competitor was higher in 
the competition condition (M = 6.50, SD = 1.26) than in the cooperation condition (M = 1.86, 
SD = 1.53), F(1, 269) = 747.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .73. Thus, the interdependence manipulation 
was effective. 
Hypothesis 1 test: attractiveness—competence association for male versus female 
candidates. Preliminary analyses for all hypotheses tests again found that participant sex had 
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neither significant effects nor interactions (ps > .218), so we report the results of analyses 
conducted without this factor.  
A mixed-effects ANOVA1 on perceived competence found that the interaction 
between candidate sex and candidate attractiveness was significant, F(1, 271) = 77.24, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .22, such that the attractive male candidate was seen as more competent (M = 6.14, 
SD = 0.71) than the unattractive male candidate (M = 5.19, SD = 0.86), F(1, 271) = 120.54, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .31, but the attractive female candidate was not perceived as differing in 
competence (M = 5.49, SD = 0.96) from the unattractive female candidate (M = 5.60, SD = 
1.06), F(1, 271) = 1.76, p = .186, ηp2 = .01. These results support Hypothesis 1. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 test: interdependence and attractiveness discrimination.  
Continuous measure of selection decisions. Mean selection decisions by condition 
are displayed in Figure 6A. A mixed-effects ANOVA found a significant 3-way interaction 
among interdependence, candidate sex, and candidate attractiveness on selection decisions, 
F(1, 269) = 66.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. The effect of candidate attractiveness varied as a 
function of interdependence among male candidates, F(1, 270) = 81.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, as 
well as among female candidates, F(1, 270) = 5.76, p = .017, ηp2 = .02, but among female 
candidate the interaction was in the opposite direction; as we detail below, this was driven by 
an unexpected weak trend of female candidates’ attractiveness in the competition condition 
that was in the opposite direction from the one found for male candidates. We analyzed 
simple effects of candidate attractiveness to test our hypotheses. 
[Insert Figure 6A about here] 
In the cooperation condition, the attractive male candidate was preferred (M = 6.49, 
SD = 0.80) to the unattractive male candidate (M = 4.70, SD = 1.30), F(1, 269) = 39.93, p < 
                                                 
1 We reran all Study 4 hypotheses tests using multilevel modeling, with attractiveness as a random factor at the 
level of stimuli (Judd et al., 2001). The results are substantively the same, so we report the simpler analysis. 
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.001, ηp2 = .13. There was no difference between preference for attractive (M = 5.19, SD = 
1.48) and unattractive female candidates (M = 5.61, SD = 1.26), F(1, 269) = 2.18, p = .141, 
ηp2 = .01. These results support Hypothesis 2. 
In the competition condition, the unattractive male candidate was preferred (M = 4.95, 
SD = 1.55) to the attractive male candidate (M = 3.05, SD = 1.71, F(1, 269) = 41.68, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .13. For female candidates, there was a weak trend in the opposite direction: The 
attractive candidate was preferred (M = 4.62, SD = 1.93) to the unattractive female candidate 
(M = 4.09, SD = 1.94), F(1, 269) = 3.64, p = .057, ηp2 = .01. The results support Hypothesis 3. 
Binary measure of selection decisions. Participants’ selection decision frequencies by 
condition are displayed in Figure 6B. We found a significant interaction between candidate 
sex and interdependence, b = -5.03, SE = 0.95, p < .001. For male candidates, the coefficient 
for the effect of interdependence (0 = cooperation, 1= competition) on binary selection 
decisions (0 = unattractive candidate, 1 = attractive candidate) was significant and negative, 
b = -4.17, SE = 0.81, p < .001. This suggests a greater likelihood of preference for the 
attractive male candidate when the decision maker expected to cooperate with the candidate 
(65 out of 69; 94.2%) than when competition was expected (11 out of 64; 17.2%).  
[Insert Figure 6B about here] 
For female candidates, the coefficient for the effect of interdependence on selection 
decisions was non-significant, b = 0.86, SE = 0.49, p = .076, showing that preference between 
the attractive and the unattractive female candidates was not affected by decision maker—
candidate interdependence. Specifically, attractive candidates were selected over unattractive 
candidates at about the same rate in both the cooperation condition (30 out of 69: 43.5%) and 
the competition condition (42 out of 71: 59.2%). The results for binary selection decisions 
also support Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
Hypothesis 4 test: the role of instrumentality perception.  
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Continuous selection decisions. The same analysis strategy was used to test mediation 
as in Study 3. When the decision maker expected to cooperate with the candidate, the higher 
perceived competence of the attractive male candidate predicted a higher perceived 
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker, b = 1.00, SE = 0.18, p < .001. In turn, 
the higher perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker predicted a higher 
selection preference for the candidate, b = 0.95, SE = 0.05, p < .001, thus producing a positive 
indirect effect of the higher perceived competence of the attractive male candidate on 
selection preference, 95% CI [0.41, 0.93].  
In contrast, when the decision maker expected to compete with the candidate, the 
higher perceived competence of the attractive male candidate predicted a lower perceived 
instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker, b = -1.28, SE = 0.18, p < .001. As 
mentioned above, the higher perceived instrumentality of the candidate to the decision maker 
in turn predicted a higher selection preference for the candidate, b = 0.95, SE = 0.05, p < .001, 
thus producing a negative indirect effect of the higher perceived competence of the attractive 
male candidate on selection preference, 95% CI [-1.38, -0.41].  
Binary selection decisions. The results of the first stage of the indirect effect for 
binary choice were identical to those for continuous decisions. In the second stage, the higher 
perceived instrumentality of the attractive male candidate to the decision maker predicted 
higher chance of being selected, b = 0.16, SE =0.01, p < .001. Thus, when the decision maker 
expected to cooperate with the candidate, the higher perceived instrumentality of the attractive 
male candidate mediated the positive effect of the higher perceived competence of the 
attractive candidate on binary selection decisions, 95% CI [0.47, 3.65]. 
In contrast, when the decision maker expected to compete with the candidate, the 
lower perceived instrumentality of the attractive male candidate mediated the negative effect 
of the higher perceived competence of the attractive candidate on binary selection decisions, 
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95% CI [-5.37, -0.41]. The results of the analyses of both continuous and binary measures of 
selection decisions support Hypothesis 4. 
General Discussion 
Four studies found evidence consistent with our theory that candidate—decision 
maker interdependence can explain when attractive men (but not women) are discriminated in 
favor of, as well as against. Our results qualify past research on attractiveness discrimination 
by challenging the conclusion that decision makers exhibit unvarying preference for attractive 
candidates (Hosoda et al., 2003). We show that taking the role of the organizational context 
into account reveals the conditions under which decision makers discriminate in favor of, as 
well as against, attractive candidates. It is worth noting that our findings do not dispute the 
general preference for attractive individuals documented in prior work on attractiveness 
discrimination.  
Although we did not find preference for attractive candidates when no 
interdependence between the decision maker and the candidate was stipulated, a large body of 
research finds support for this effect (Hosoda et al., 2003). We believe it is possible that 
different processes operate in parallel, such that decision makers generally prefer attractive 
candidates (as suggested by most theories and research on attractiveness), but in situations in 
which their personal outcomes are affected by the decision, they engage in a calculated 
assessment of anticipated candidate competence and instrumentality (as suggested by our 
data). The different theoretical perspectives would thus explain different causes of 
attractiveness discrimination in different situations. This possibility is consistent Langlois and 
colleagues’ (2000) argument that attractiveness discrimination is multi-determined.  
Our work also contributes to research arguing that decision makers prefer unattractive 
same-sex candidates as a result of intrasexual competition processes (e.g., Agthe et al., 2010; 
Luxen & Van De Vijver, 2006). We believe our theory is not mutually exclusive with this 
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past work. It is possible that each theory captures a different reason why attractiveness 
discrimination occurs. But one explanatory limitation of research highlighting intrasexual 
competition is that it was unable to account for findings showing that decision makers prefer 
attractive candidates to equally qualified unattractive, even when the candidate is of the same 
sex as the decision maker (e.g., Bardack & McAndrew, 1985; Cann et al., 1981; Dipboye et 
al., 1977; Dipboye et al., 1975; Marlowe et al., 1996; Quereshi & Kay, 1986; Watkins & 
Johnston, 2000). Our theory explains why decision makers would in some cases discriminate 
against, and in some cases, in favor of, attractive same-sex candidates. More importantly, we 
go beyond the focus on intrasexual competition by considering the role of task-related 
interdependence, a defining feature of organizations.  
Finally, we believe a more general contribution of our research is the emphasis on self-
interested motives in discrimination. Much modern social psychological work focuses on 
demonstrating behavior contrary to that predicted by rational choice theory. Research on 
discrimination (including attractiveness discrimination) is no exception: Decision makers are 
thought of as exhibiting irrational, unvarying preferences for attractive people (Hosoda et al., 
2003). Our research extends this thinking by demonstrating that more calculating motives 
may also underlie attractiveness discrimination: Because people infer competence from 
external cues, such as attractiveness, they discriminate based on the competence inference in 
situations in which others’ competence is clearly relevant to their personal outcomes (e.g., 
cooperation and competition). Our work reveals that once self-serving motives are taken into 
account, decision makers discriminate both in favor of and against the same group of people 
depending on which course of action is the most self-benefiting. These findings recast 
attractiveness discrimination as calculated (albeit misguided), self-interested behavior.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Our research focused on situations in which decision makers face a choice between 
equally qualified candidates. Doing so allowed us to isolate the effect of attractiveness in 
selection decisions and thus measure attractiveness discrimination. It is possible that people 
are particularly likely to rely on superficial cues to differentiate candidate competence in 
situations in which there are no clear differences in terms of objective information about 
candidate competence. However, when some candidates are clearly more qualified than 
others, attractiveness might play less of a role in selection decisions. Indeed, prior research 
has shown that discrimination based on attractiveness or other social category information 
declines when there are obvious differences in objective qualifications between candidates 
(Dipboye et al., 1975; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). 
Second, we tested our theory across a limited number of tasks for which candidates 
were being considered. Some prior research emphasized the importance of the type of task the 
candidate was applying for (e.g., Cash et al., 1977; Heilman & Saruwatari, 1979; S. K. 
Johnson et al., 2010). This research suggests that some tasks are stereotyped as more 
masculine and some as more feminine, and that candidate attractiveness might be an 
advantage when applying for gender-appropriate tasks, but a hindrance when applying for 
gender-inappropriate tasks (although empirical support for this idea has been questioned; e.g., 
Hosoda et al., 2003; Shahani, Dipboye, & Gehrlein, 1993). We note, however, that this 
perspective does not present an alternative explanation for our findings. If participants had 
stereotyped the tasks as masculine, we should have found discrimination against attractive 
female candidates. We did not. If participants had stereotyped the tasks we used as feminine, 
we should have found discrimination against attractive male candidates. We found the 
opposite pattern in the cooperation condition. Nevertheless, future research might replicate 
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our results across different task types (also see Carlsson, Björklund, & Bäckström, 2012) to 
provide further evidence for our theory. 
Third, we focus on situations in which decision makers’ self-interested motives are the 
most salient guide for behavior. However, decision makers are sometimes bound by other 
motives, such as the motive to appear fair. People likely don’t want to seem as if they hired 
less competent candidates for self-serving reasons. To the extent that there is a risk that others 
might construe attractiveness-based selection decisions as self-serving, it is possible that the 
effects we document will weaken. In such cases, it is possible that decision makers would try 
to balance the two motives by selecting candidates who seem competent enough, but not too 
threatening. Future research is needed to test the role of fairness motives. 
Fourth, another limitation of this research is that we emphasized experimental control 
at the expense of focusing on data collections in the field. The rationale for that was that we 
proposed a new explanation of attractiveness discrimination, so we believed internal validity 
was of primary concern. We tried to mitigate threats to external validity by emphasizing the 
working population in our studies. Regardless, we do believe that future research replicating 
our findings in the field is necessary to enhance the generalizability of our theory. 
Finally, our theory explains why decision makers discriminate on the basis of physical 
attractiveness among male candidates, but it does not explain attractiveness discrimination in 
directed at women. We predicted a weaker attractiveness—competence association among 
women on the basis of past research, so we sought to test the differential implications of our 
theory for male versus female candidates. At the same time, the fact that we found no effects 
among female candidates can be considered an explanatory limitation of our theory. Other 
motives may be driving discrimination among female candidates, and complementary theories 
of discrimination must be recruited to model such behavior. 
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Practical Implications 
Many selection decisions in organizations occur in the context of decision maker—
candidate interdependence (Edenborough, 2005; Harris et al., 2003). Our results suggest this 
organizational factor can promote discriminatory behavior among decision makers both in 
favor of and against attractive male candidates. Managers might employ several techniques to 
minimize such problematic tendencies. First, managers could delegate selection decisions to 
employees who are have no connection to the organizational activities for which candidates 
are being considered. This would minimize expected decision maker—candidate 
interdependence, thus weakening one basis for attractiveness discrimination. However, it is 
often the employees who are working on the same organizational tasks who are best suited to 
evaluate candidate quality, so in some cases this strategy might not be feasible.  
Another route for reducing discriminatory behavior implied by our theory is 
implementing decision-making accountability systems, i.e., policies that require decision 
makers to justify their decisions (Tetlock, 1985). Accountability has been shown to reduce 
stereotypical thinking by motivating the thorough processing of social information (Weary, 
Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001). Accountability might thus reduce the (stereotypical) 
association between attractiveness and competence for male candidates and, in that way, 
undercut the psychological process resulting in attractiveness discrimination.  
Managers might also reduce discriminatory behavior by promoting joint, rather than 
separate, evaluation of candidates, such that the key candidates are considered at the same 
time (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992). Joint evaluation should motivate comparisons 
of objective candidate characteristics (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999), such 
as education and employment history. In this way, managers might reduce the biased 
perception of attractive male candidates as more competent and, as a consequence, minimize 
discrimination.  
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Appendix A: Study 1 Interdependence Manipulation 
The initial part of the scenarios was the same for all conditions: 
After graduating from college, you have been working as an entry-level employee for 
a marketing and sales team in a well-known telecommunication company for a few 
months. You are the only entry-level employee in your team. Your team is looking to 
hire an additional entry-level employee, and your team manager made the following 
remarks about your future in a meeting. 
Next, participants in the cooperation (competition) condition read the message from 
the team manager: 
You and the new hire will perform a joint task (two similar tasks respectively) for the 
next few months. Depending on the joint (relative) performance, I will make a 
promotion decision for you and the new hire. If the joint performance is good, both 
will be promoted, if it is poor, both will have to leave the team and the company (only 
the one with better performance will be promoted and the one with poorer 
performance will have to leave the team and the company). 
In the no interdependence condition, interdependence was not described (i.e., there 
were no manager’s remarks).  
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Appendix B: Study 1 Attractiveness Manipulation Check 
To verify the effectiveness of the attractiveness manipulation, we recruited an 
independent sample of 103 adults (63.1% male; Mage = 32.69, SDage = 9.20) from Amazon’s 
Mechnical Turk. Pretest participants were randomly assigned to view either male or female 
pictures and were asked to indicate (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) whether they 
thought the person in the picture was “attractive,” “good-looking,” and “beautiful,” based on 
attractiveness measures used in prior research (S. K. Johnson et al., 2010; Lee, Loewenstein, 
Ariely, Hong, & Young, 2008; Sadalla, Kenrick, & Vershure, 1987).  
The attractive male was perceived as more attractive (M = 5.15, SD = 0.69; α = .73) 
than the unattractive male (M = 3.21, SD = 0.97; α = .87), F(1, 101) = 136.06, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.57. In addition, the attractive female was perceived as more attractive (M = 5.90, SD = 0.71; 
α = .86) than the unattractive female (M = 3.53, SD = 1.25; α = .91), F(1, 101) = 196.71, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .66. Finally, we note that the candidate attractiveness × candidate sex interaction 
was non-significant, F(1, 101) = 3.09, p = .082, ηp2 = .30; the effect of the attractiveness 
manipulation did not differ as a function of candidate sex. The findings suggest that our 
attractiveness manipulation was effective and standardized for male versus female candidates.  
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Appendix C: Study 2 Interdependence Manipulation 
Your aim in this game is to cooperate with the other player to get as many correct 
answers as possible as a team. During the game, each correct answer earns 3 points, 
and all the points (earned by both you and your partner) will be aggregated. At the end 
of the game, all the points will be evenly divided between the two players. For 
example, if you get 6 correct answers, and the other player gets 5 correct answers, 
each of you will get half of the total points. 
Participants in the competition condition read: 
Your aim in this game is to compete with the other player to get more correct answers 
than he/she does. During the game, each correct answer earns 3 points, and all the 
points (earned either by you or your partner) will be aggregated. At the end of the 
game, all the points will be given to the player who gets more correct answers than the 
other player. For example, if you get 6 correct answers, and the other player gets 5 
correct answers, you will get all the points, and your partner will get none. 
Participants in the no interdependence condition were told: 
Your aim in this game is to get as many correct answers as possible individually. 
During the game, each correct answer earns 3 points, and all the points (earned by both 
you and your partner) will be aggregated. At the end of the game, you will get the 
points you earned and the other player will get the points he/she earned. For example, 
if you get 6 correct answers, and the other player gets 5 correct answers, each of you 
will get the respective amount of points you earned. 
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Appendix D: Study 4 Attractiveness Manipulation Check 
Next, we recruited an independent sample of 119 adults (62.2% male; Mage = 32.32, 
SDage = 9.01) following the same procedure as in the Study 1 pretest. They were asked to 
indicate their perception of the attractiveness of the 35 students, using the same 3-item 
measure of perceived attractiveness as in the Study 1 pretest. Based on these results, we 
selected a final set of 12 photographs (3 attractive men; 3 unattractive men; 3 attractive 
women; and 3 unattractive women) such that the mean difference between attractive versus 
unattractive men (ΔM = 1.13) was almost identical to the mean difference between attractive 
versus unattractive women (ΔM = 1.17). Thus, this procedure ensured that the strength of the 
attractiveness manipulation was standardized across candidate sex.  
Formal tests provided evidence of the manipulation effectiveness and standardization. 
Attractive males were perceived as more attractive (M = 4.68, SD = 1.24; α = .91) than 
unattractive males (M = 3.55, SD = 1.24; α = .81), F(1, 117) = 65.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. In 
addition, attractive females were also perceived as more attractive (M = 5.64, SD = 0.87; α = 
.90) than unattractive females (M = 4.47, SD = 0.92; α = .85), F(1, 117) = 76.76, p < .001, ηp2 
= .40. Finally, the candidate attractiveness × candidate sex interaction was non-significant, 
F(1, 117) = 0.04, p = .839, ηp2 < .01, which is to say that the effect of the attractiveness 
manipulation did not differ as a function of candidate sex. The findings thus show that the 
attractiveness manipulation was effective and was highly standardized for male versus female 
candidates.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the theory. 
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Figure 2. Moderated mediation model testing the hypothesized psychological process. 
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Figure 3. Study 1: Mean selection decisions by condition. Error bars represent standard 
errors.  
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Figure 4. Study 2: Mean selection decisions by condition. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
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Figure 5A. Study 3: Mean selection decisions by condition. Error bars represent standard 
errors.  
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Figure 5B. Study 3: Binary selection decision frequencies by condition.  
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Figure 6A. Study 4: Mean selection decisions by condition. Error bars represent standard 
errors.  
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Figure 6B. Study 4: Binary selection decision frequencies by condition. 
